The Human Consciousness Now...Our World in the Midst of Becoming...to What? Observe, contemplate Now.
Apr 6 2026 (IPS) -
Donald Trump ran on a platform of ending wars. After his success in Venezuela, he is intoxicated by his military achievements and is banking on regime change in several countries.
In a swift and decisive move, US forces abducted Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and his wife to the United States. The current government in Caracas has little choice but to largely submit to Washington’s dictates. Trump’s motives for the war against Iran remain unclear, partly because the US president has cited various reasons: to finally destroy the Iranian nuclear program, to end the Iranian threat to the Middle East, to support the Iranian people, and to overthrow the terrible regime in Tehran. He remains vague about his reasoning and seems to make off the cuff suggestions for regime change. Trump had a lofty idea at how he envisions the end of this war. He has suggested “unconditional surrender,” followed by his personal involvement in the selection of a successor: I must be involved in picking Iran’s next leader.
The swift victory against Iran failed to materialize, an end to the war is not in sight, and a new leader has been chosen without Trump’s involvement. The structures of the mullah regime appear so entrenched that the anticipated regime change following the rapid decapitation of the leadership did not occur. Yet Donald Trump had proclaimed: “What we did in Venezuela is, in my opinion, the perfect, the perfect scenario.” The Atlantic calls this attitude a “hostile corporate takeover of an entire country”. Now the US government expects Cuba to surrender. “I think I could do anything I want” with Cuba, Trump declared, now that the island is virtually cut off from energy supplies and its economy is in ruins. He is demanding the removal of Cuban President Diaz-Canel.
In the business world hostile corporate takeovers sometimes work, sometimes they fail. Similarly with Trump’s idea of swift government surrenders. In the case of Iran, he was misguided by the Wall Street playbook. Irresponsibly, he called on Iranians to overthrow the government before the bombing campaign started. Regime change in Iran has now been forgotten and Trump is agnostic about democracy. He is interested to get the oil price down and the stock market up.
Lessons from the past
The concept of regime change—replacing the top of the government to install one more agreeable to the US—is not new to US foreign policy. Proponents of regime change usually point to Japan and Germany as positive examples of successful democratization. Often, however, the goal is not, or at least not primarily, democratization, but rather the installation of a government that is ideologically close to the US or amenable to them. But the “Trump Corollary”, as explicitly stated in the National Security Strategy to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, is not new either. In reality, it was already the Kennedy, Nixon, Reagan, and Bush doctrine.
Both Trump’s idea of regime change and his rigorously pursued territorial ambitions (Canada, Greenland, the Panama Canal) are reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, particularly the version of this doctrine expanded by President Roosevelt in 1904. This doctrine legitimized American interventions in Latin America. At the beginning of the 20th century, the US intervened in numerous Latin American countries in ‘its backyard’, using military and intelligence means: in Colombia, to support Panamanian separatists in controlling the Panama Canal; repeatedly in the Dominican Republic; they occupied Cuba from 1906 to 1909 and intervened there repeatedly afterward; in Nicaragua during the so-called ‘Banana War’, to protect the interests of the US company United Fruit; in Mexico, as well as in Haiti and Honduras.
The New York Times recently suggested that Trump’s current enthusiasm for regime change is most comparable to that of Dwight D. Eisenhower. During his two terms in office from 1953 to 1961, the once coldly calculating general allowed himself to be seduced into a downward spiral from one coup to the next. In 1953, the US succeeded in overthrowing the elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh with Operation Ajax. Mossadegh wanted to nationalize the British-owned oil industry. The coup succeeded with CIA support. The US installed the Shah as its puppet. He ruled with absolute power until the so-called Iranian Revolution and the dictatorship of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. After the successful overthrow of the government in Iran, Eisenhower decided to intervene in Guatemala. The elected president, Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán, who initiated far-reaching land reform laws, was overthrown in a coup d’état in 1954 and replaced by the pro-American colonel, Castillo Armas.
During this period, the US government also formulated the so-called domino theory, which aimed to prevent governments, particularly in Asia, from aligning themselves with the Soviet Union. The assumption was that if one domino fell, others would follow. It was during this time that the costly war in Korea ended in an armistice. Therefore, countries like Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Indonesia, and others were on Eisenhower’s domino list. However, the destabilization campaigns carried out by the CIA sometimes had the opposite effect. Governments in Indonesia and Syria emerged strengthened from the interventions. Eisenhower left Kennedy with the loss of American influence in Cuba. The failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, intended to overthrow Fidel Castro, was the starting point for the decades-long blockade of Cuba, which Trump is determined to end now through regime change.
The most dramatic example of failed regime change in recent history is undoubtedly the Iraq War, which began in 2003 under President George W. Bush. The stated goal was to remove Saddam Hussein from power and destroy his weapons of mass destruction. The war led to the overthrow of the regime. The United Nations and US teams found no weapons of mass destruction despite intensive on-site investigations. Attempts to establish an orderly state in Iraq failed. These experiences, and especially the disastrous outcome of two decades of military intervention in Afghanistan, discredited the concept of regime change.
What are the implications?
The most important lesson taught by efforts to affect externally forced regime change is that interventions often lead to crises that were ostensibly meant to be prevented or solved. The temptation was too great for Trump to miss the opportunity to depose the despised Maduro government.
Scholarly studies of the numerous attempted regime changes and democratization efforts reveal three key findings. First, simply removing the government from power (whether through assassination, as in the case of Saddam Hussein in Iraq or now in Iran, or through kidnapping as in Venezuela) is insufficient, as such actions often lead to chaos, state collapse, or even civil war. Thus, it will be interesting to watch further developments in Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran.
A second lesson from empirical studies of regime change is that democratization is more likely to succeed if democratic experience already existed in the country. However, this is often not the case.
Finally, if the real goal is democratization (and not just to secure spheres of influence or oil supplies etc.), it is far more promising not only to hold elections (as in Afghanistan, for example), but to renounce violence and initiate a long-term program with development aid and support for civil society.
Whether the US government will be impressed by these findings, or even acknowledge them, is doubtful. Currently, the American president is euphoric, despite the strong reaction from the Iranian government which he, surprisingly, did not expect. His promises to end the senseless wars and not start any new ones, however, seem to have been forgotten.
Related articles:
The US: Good at Starting but Bad at Ending Wars
Failure of US–Iran Talks Was All Too Predictable — But Turning to Military Strikes Creates Dangerous Unknowns
The ‘Donroe Doctrine’
The Return of the Ugly American
Herbert Wulf is a Professor of International Relations and former Director of the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies (BICC). He is presently a Senior Fellow at BICC, an Adjunct Senior Researcher at the Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg/Essen, Germany, and a Research Affiliate at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand. He serves on the Scientific Council of SIPRI.
This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.
IPS UN Bureau
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Apr 6 2026 (IPS) - Bangladesh’s first credible election in nearly two decades delivered a landslide win for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its leader Tarique Rahman, son of a former prime minister, just back from 17 years of self-imposed exile.
The election was made possible by a Generation Z-led uprising that security forces sought to repress by killing at least 1,400 people. The protest that began when young people rose up against a job quota system that functioned as a tool of patronage grew into a movement that brought down a government. Many protesters wanted something beyond the ousting of an authoritarian government, calling for old politics to be swept aside and young people to have a genuine say in government. What’s resulted falls short of that, and Bangladesh’s new government should be aware that unless it delivers genuine change, protests could rise again.
The uprising
The 2024 protests that toppled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina began when Bangladesh’s High Court reinstated a 30 per cent quota for descendants of 1971 independence war veterans, leaving less than half of public sector jobs open to recruitment based on merit. In a country with acute youth unemployment, frustrated young people rejected this system as a vehicle for Awami League patronage. Coordinated by the Students Against Discrimination network, the movement spread nationwide through road and railway blockades.
The government’s response turned a policy dispute into a political crisis. Members of the Awami League’s student wing attacked protesters. Authorities imposed a nationwide curfew with a shoot-on-sight order, shut down the internet and directed security forces to fire lethal weapons into crowds. But the repression backfired. People used their phones to document every incident, and footage circulated widely after internet access was partly restored, directly undermining the government’s narrative that cast protesters as violent agitators. The killing of student coordinator Abu Sayed, filmed as he stood unarmed with arms outstretched before police opened fire, became the uprising’s defining image.
On 5 August 2024, facing a mass march on her residence, Hasina fled to India on an army helicopter. As CIVICUS’s 2026 State of Civil Society Report sets out, Bangladesh’s Gen Z-led uprising went on to inspire subsequent protests in Indonesia, Nepal and beyond.
Reforms in the balance
Three days after Hasina fled, Nobel Peace Prize-winning economist Muhammad Yunus was sworn in as Chief Adviser of an interim government. This was a victory for the student movement, which had made clear it would not accept a military-backed administration. His government established reform commissions covering the constitution, corruption, judiciary, police and public administration, and negotiated the July National Charter with political parties: 84 proposals designed to reduce the concentration of power in the prime minister’s office and make it structurally harder for any future government to capture the state the way Hasina had. Most parties signed it in October 2025.
But the path to the election was neither clean nor consensual. The International Crimes Tribunal, a domestic judicial body reinstated by the interim government, convicted Hasina in absentia for crimes against humanity and sentenced her to death. In May 2025, the interim government banned the Awami League under anti-terrorism legislation. International observers warned that excluding the country’s largest party risked disenfranchising millions and undermining the election’s democratic credibility.
The election timing was also bitterly contested: the BNP, eager to capitalise on its frontrunner status, pushed for an early date, while the newly formed National Citizen Party (NCP), founded by Gen Z protesters, wanted more time to organise and for institutional reforms to be locked in first. The BNP prevailed.
A dynasty returns
The BNP and its allies won 209 of 299 contested seats, securing a decisive two-thirds parliamentary majority. The right-wing Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami — whose 2013 ban the interim government lifted — emerged as the main opposition with close to 80 seats, its best-ever result. The NCP won just six of the 30 seats it contested.
The NCP’s poor showing had partly structural causes — formed in February 2025, it had barely a year to build an organisation with limited funds and no networks beyond urban centres — and was partly self-inflicted. A decision to ally with Jamaat-e-Islami as part of an 11-party coalition alienated many young voters who had hoped for genuinely new politics. Prominent NCP figures resigned in protest and stood as independents. NCP leader Nahid Islam, just 27 years old, did win a seat, and the party has pledged to rebuild in opposition.
The election itself was a genuine improvement on Bangladesh’s recent history. Turnout reached 60 per cent, up from 42 per cent in the fraud-ridden 2024 poll. Over 60 per cent of voters endorsed the July Charter in a referendum that was held alongside the election, giving the reform agenda a democratic mandate the new government will find difficult to ignore. Yet the vote would have been more legitimate had all parties been permitted to compete freely, and the campaign was not fully free of violence either: rights groups documented that at least 16 political activists were killed in the run-up to polling day.
Now the BNP inherits a state apparatus politicised over decades of one-party dominance and holds a two-thirds parliamentary majority with no meaningful check on its authority. Whether it will govern differently from those it replaced, or simply settle into the same logic of power, remains to be seen. The young people whose uprising made this election possible are watching. They have already brought down one government. The new one would do well to remember this.
Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org
BRIGHTON, UK, Apr 6 2026 (IPS) - Urgent steps need to be taken to rebuild the relationship between citizens and state to stem the decline of democracy globally. Experts point to inequality and political exclusion as two of the biggest drivers for democratic backsliding, with the exclusion of citizens from a role in policy and decision-making spaces leading to ‘hollow citizenship’.
A report, published by the Institute of Development Studies, comes as Europe, Africa, Latin America, Asia and the US, have seen a rise in support for populist leaders on the left and right stoking division and weakening democratic safeguards, such as free and fair elections and free media.
This has led to key aspects of democracy declining during the last decade and now 74% of the
world’s population (6 billion) live in autocracies.
In response, the report authors call for an urgent rethink of democracy – which evidence shows delivers better social and economic outcomes than other regimes – to focus on people, power and inequality and less on institutions.
The experts say that past efforts to strengthen democracy globally focused too much on strengthening institutions, like legislature, judicial systems and electoral commissions and neglected the needs of people.
To sustain and strengthen democracies for the future, the reports call for urgent action to ensure people are included and engaged in democracy at local and national levels.
Shandana Khan Mohmand, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, said: “After decades of unsuccessful efforts, and millions of dollars spent by Western powers to try and strengthen democracy globally, we need to learn the lessons about what does and doesn’t work.
“While supporting democratic institutions like electoral commissions, judicial systems and independent media are all critically important, evidence shows that the missing ingredient is people – and the extent that they can engage in democracy in meaningful ways. Whether in local council decisions about community parks or on a nation’s policy on green energy, or going to war, citizens need to be included and feel that they are heard in decision making.”
While there was optimism that digital technology, and particularly social media, would act as a force for democratisation and improving transparency and accountability, the research finds that has only led to limited gains.
Instead, the evidence shows that digital technology has been harnessed by regimes to support a descent into authoritarianism, using tactics like mass surveillance and internet shutdowns to suppress dissent and human rights.
The report also finds that the notable youth-led uprisings, such as in Bangladesh, Nepal and Madagascar attracted the headlines but that it is the more everyday acts of young people demonstrating inclusion and collective decision-making, rather than the mass protests, that are more significant for strengthening democracy and peace.
Marjoke Oosterom, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, said: “The scale of democratic backsliding globally serves as a warning to leaders of high, middle and low-income democracies alike. They ignore inequality and political exclusion at their peril as both are being exploited by anti-democratic politicians to stoke division, and lead people to question whether democracy works for them.
“The evidence shows that democracy is still the best model for an inclusive and fair society and urgent action is needed to halt the current democratic decline we are seeing in continents around the world.”
Despite the budget cuts by governments across Europe and the USA which significantly reduced initiatives designed to strengthen democracy globally, the report includes several recommendations for ways that states, policymakers and philanthropist funders can help strengthen democracy.
Those include fixing the relationship between states and citizens via greater inclusion of people in governance and politics, making space for diverse opinions and ideological positions, and public policy to address the needs of marginalised groups and reduce inequality, which in turn builds trust in democracy.
IPS UN Bureau
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 6 2026 (IPS) - The US has spelled out in detail its own concept of what a restructured United Nations should look like: after drastic reductions in staff, cutting down its budget, avoiding duplication in mandates, slashing peacekeeping operations worldwide and deploying artificial intelligence (AI) for translations and interpretations in six languages.
As the biggest single contributor to the UN budget – and despite nearly $4.0 billion in unpaid dues —it is using its perceived financial clout to help radically change the world body.
The US says it wants to “make UN great again (MUNGA)”—variation of President Trump’s oft-repeated slogan “Make America Great Again (MAGA)”.
But will it work? And is it feasible?
Ambassador Mike Waltz, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, addressing a Congressional Field Hearing on UN Reform, said last week: “As I stated in my confirmation hearing, the UN truly does need to get what we’re calling back to basics and back to its original mission, from its founding, back to maintaining international peace and security.
As I’ve mentioned in my hearing then, the UN’s budget in the last 25 years has quadrupled. We have not seen, arguably, a quadrupling of peace and security around the world commensurate with those hard-earned dollars, he said.
“So, we are pressing it. We’re pressing it to streamline its bureaucracy, to eliminate duplication. We’ve made it clear that we will cease participation in some UN agencies that undermine our sovereignty and cannot be reformed.”
Earlier this year, he pointed out, President Trump did announce “our withdrawal from 66 international organizations. That review is ongoing. And from my perspective, let me be clear, the U.S. will not fund organizations that act contrary to our interests.”
On UN compensation and personnel, he said, we’re leading reforms to what is often exorbitant compensation and benefit standards that the over 100,000 UN staff receive. The UN pays 17% more than U.S. equivalent civil servants, even though many of them are right here in New York.
They also have additional generous benefits packages far exceeding what our great civil servants, both here and abroad, receive. And staff costs alone are 70% of their regular budget of these things we’re trying to bring back in line.
“So, we need to, and we are working to bring those compensation and benefits packages back in line with common sense standards. Part of that will be the pension. There’s over $100 billion in management, in the UN pension with 16% – I don’t know of an employer or a government out there that contributes 16% to their pension”.
And there’s other reforms, he said.
For example, the number of interpreters and translators – times six for the six UN languages here – technology can be used, AI can be used, remote translation can be used that will save a lot of the travel and the conference costs, said Waltz.
Stephen Zunes, Professor of Politics at the University of San Francisco and director of Middle Eastern Studies, who has written extensively on the politics of the United Nations, told Inter Press Service (IPS) this is not about cost-cutting or fiscal responsibility.
“Like cutbacks to important U.S. government agencies and domestic programs, the Trump administration appears determined to dismantle the system itself.”
This should be understood in the context of pulling out of international organizations and treaties, the establishment of the so-called “Board of Peace,” the Iran War, and the recently-announced dramatic increases in military spending–it is about undermining international legal institutions and replacing it with an imperial order backed by raw military force, said Dr Zunes.
Richard Gowan, Program Director, Global Issues and Institutions, at the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, told IPS in the first half of 2025, U.S. policy towards the UN was pretty chaotic, and diplomats from other countries really had no idea what Washington wanted from the world organization.
Like it or not, he said, Mike Waltz and his team have brought some message discipline and are clarifying their goals for the UN pretty sharply.
“Most diplomats say that Waltz can be reasonable in private and that ultimately, he and his team want to reshape the UN rather than just wreck it. There are times when Waltz goes out of his way to bash the UN and individual UN officials on social media, but I think that is partly him playing to the Republican base”.
Waltz is clear that he wants a slimmed-down UN, Gowan pointed out, and it is worth admitting that this is a popular message among many UN member states. The U.S. is not alone in thinking that the organization’s bureaucracy has grown too big and needs a tough financial diet.
“Trump, Rubio and Waltz are pretty consistent in arguing that the UN should focus on peace and security issues. But I think the administration has not really convinced most other UN members that it has a plan to make the UN deliver on conflict prevention and diplomacy again.”
Instead, he said, the U.S. appears to have a very selective and instrumentalist approach to when and how it uses the UN as a security partner. It wants the UN to help in Haiti but to get out of the way in Lebanon. I do not think there is really a coherent vision at work here. It is a very ad hoc, case-by-case approach.
“Trump’s boosting of the Board of Peace as a potential alternative to the UN has complicated Waltz’s position too. The fact that Trump is willing to flirt with the Board, even if it is not a very serious institution, makes it harder to believe that Washington really wants the UN to regain credibility on peace and security,” declared Gowan.
Meanwhile, excerpts from Ambassador Waltz’s testimony include:
–“On budget and staffing cuts, the UN should be doing less and doing it better. Let’s get it more focused and actually achieve more results. The 2026 UN regular budget was estimated at $3.45 billion. The U.S. funds roughly a fifth of that at $820 million in 2025 alone.
–Again, I think we need to reduce the UN’s size and assure every taxpayer dollar is spent responsibly, and thanks to the strong efforts by the United States, led by Ambassador Bartos here and his team in what we call the UN’s Fifth Committee, which approves its budget, we are working towards a leaner and better prioritized 2026 budget going forward.
–In December, we led Member States to adopt a historic 15% cut. $570 million out of the UN’s regular budget. That will eliminate nearly 3000 headquarters positions. And for our contribution, it will reduce our assessment by $126 million. So just in the six months that we’ve been here, we will see going forward, $126 million savings to the U.S. taxpayer.
–We’ve also pushed for a 25% reduction in peacekeeping troops, and I’ll talk a bit about other peacekeeping reforms in a moment that will also save us tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars while enabling what we call here the repatriation, the sending home of poorly performing peacekeeping troops.
–From an oversight perspective, beyond the salaries and benefits, oversight is essential. We’re leading efforts to empower oversight bodies to root out waste, fraud, and abuse, and misconduct.
On peacekeeping reform, he said, the administration has been clear about focusing on the core mandate of peace and security, and we’re leading efforts to wind down some of these ineffective and costly peacekeeping missions.
Some of them have been around for 30, 50, even 80 years. So, it’s one thing to stop a conflict, to insert an international force, to part ways with warring, with the two sides, or to separate them, to create the space for a political resolution.
But it can’t then become an excuse to not have a political resolution. When you have a peacekeeping force, for example, in DRC and Congo, at the cost of a billion dollars a year, that’s been there for 30 years – you can do the math and see how we have a mission creep.
So, what we’re looking to do is, as these peacekeeping forces come up for renewal, usually on an annual basis, tie them to a political process and use that as an opportunity to drive efficiencies along those lines, again, led by our reform team here that we have an ambassador, someone of an ambassador rank dedicated to.
This is just as a quick aside, the reimbursement for the equipment that these peacekeeping forces bring, sometimes to the tunes of 10,000 18,000 soldiers. It’s quite significant. These countries were being reimbursed whether they use the equipment or not.
All they had to do is bring it. So, there was an obvious incentive in place – and we received this feedback from the field, to not use the equipment very much, don’t have a lot of wear and tear, and countries would still receive the same level of reimbursement.
We just negotiated new rules, first time ever that put standards in place that the equipment actually has to be used for the peacekeeping force before you receive reimbursement. These are the kind of common-sense reforms that I think are pretty hard to argue with, although we received a lot of push back, because for a lot of these countries, it’s a money maker for their ministries of defense. We were able to just get those reforms.
Just a few examples as we look to streamline these mandates, we’re also looking to draw some of them down. UNIFIL and Lebanon, we’ve made it clear hasn’t achieved its goals, hasn’t lived up to its mandate and should be drawn down in the next year.
We’re looking at a strategic review of the peacekeeping force in Western Sahara that has been there for 50 years. We are putting benchmarks in place for the peacekeeping force that’s in Southern Sudan. We just oversaw the orderly closure of UNAMI in Iraq, which will reduce costs by $87 million annually.
We just pressed for closure of the special political mission in Yemen that will save $25 million annually. We streamlined missions in Colombia and Haiti, saving approximately $20 million annually. So again, these peacekeeping missions that solve problems not exist indefinitely.
On the humanitarian system, just as a personal aside, as someone who has served across Africa and the Middle East, I can’t tell you how many times I would pull up to this tiny ministry in a small country in Africa or in South Asia, and you have more UN vehicles in the parking lot than they have in their entire ministry from 16, 17, 18, different agencies, often with overlapping missions – all meaning well, all trying to help.
But we’ve now pulled a lot of our funding that will force these agencies to use the same warehouses, use the same aviation, use the same vehicle fleets, and eliminate a lot of that duplication of waste in their back offices.
So, moving forward, these reforms have made some significant steps. We have a long way to go – as I’m sure we’ll hear about today – to create a more focused, leaner and effective UN. We are just getting started.
We’re building on this momentum heading into the next year with both long overdue changes, the UN’s compensation system and pension plan, streamlining these peacekeeping missions, halting waste that undermine the effectiveness. And we’ll work with the UN leadership to align our reform agenda with the Secretary-General’s – what he calls his UN 80 mandate.
We will have a new Secretary-General elected this year, and we’re having those conversations now with the candidates of what they seek to keep and continue, or what new they seek to put in place, but reform is at the top of our list as we meet with some of these candidates.
So, this is a critical moment with senior leadership transitions approaching here over this next year. We need to have a clear message. We will prioritize qualified Americans. Representative DeLauro, along the lines of what you sought to do so many years ago, of having qualified Americans in UN leadership positions, not just here, but across the ecosystem in Geneva, in Vienna, and Nairobi and other places where you have UN agencies.
And I’ll just conclude with echoing President Trump’s own words.
As he said most recently at the General Assembly: the UN has tremendous potential. My charge from him is to help it realize that potential. We are dedicated to making the UN live up to that promise, to making the UN great again – if I can say so our new acronym, MUNGA.
The UN is the one place where everyone can talk. If we walked away tomorrow – which I nor the president, are advocating – it would be reinvented somewhere else. I will push hard and continuously to have it right here in the United States where it belongs.
And I look forward to keeping open dialogue with your committee. I thank you for the legislation, Chairman, that you pushed through. It adds additional arrows in our quiver to help make the UN great again,” declared Waltz.
IPS UN Bureau Report
NYAMTAI, Uganda, Apr 3 2026 (IPS) - Environmental activists and farmer groups opposed to the construction of the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP), the world’s longest heated oil pipeline, are mounting a last-ditch legal effort meant to stop its construction in a suit they plan to have filed in London, UK, believing that it stands a chance to stop the controversial project despite being at the 78 percent completion stage.
The groups have engaged the services of the London law firm of Leigh Day, one of the UK’s leading environmental and public interest litigation firms, which in the past has won landmark compensation cases for northern Kenyan communities affected by unexploded UK military munitions, among others.
With the pipeline construction said to be nearly 80 percent complete, the groups believe their petition stands a good chance of success since EACOP is owned by a company registered at the Companies House in London – the EACOP Ltd.
This is despite the controversial 1,443 km pipeline, principally owned by TotalEnergies with a 62 percent stake, meant to evacuate crude from Western Uganda oilfields to the Indian port of Tanga in Tanzania, which has survived several suits filed in the region and in France and, despite the withdrawal of several would-be financiers, looks all set for completion later in the year, with the first oil exports due in October 2026.
Other owners of the pipeline are the governments of Uganda and Tanzania via the Uganda National Oil Company (UNOC – 15 percent) and the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC – 15 percent), and the Chinese multinational China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC – 8 percent).
The plaintiffs, who include project-affected persons (PAPs) from across Uganda, are buoyed by the support of the global campaign group Avaaz, which in February initiated a fundraising effort to help with costs of the suit, ahead of its expected commencement in May.
They claim that the pipeline will violate rights protected by the Ugandan Constitution, which gives every citizen the right to a clean and healthy environment.
The local farmers allege that the construction and operation of the pipeline will have a material impact on global temperatures with severe consequences both worldwide and in Uganda. Further, they alleged that the pipeline is in breach of EACOP Ltd’s own legal obligations under Uganda’s National Environment Act and National Climate Change Act.
Snaking through Uganda and Tanzania, it will tear through some of the planet’s “most wondrous ecosystems”, carving up elephant sanctuaries, protected forests, and more than 200 rivers.
In addition, the massive infrastructure, also the longest crude oil pipeline in Africa, will result in almost 400 million tonnes of emissions over its lifetime and have a major impact on climate change, they claim.
Besides, they argue that the emissions released by oil carried by the pipeline will ‘materially’ contribute to global warming and fear the impact this will have on them and their livelihoods, as well as on the environment and the health of Ugandans.
EACOP is expected to result in more than 372 million tonnes of CO₂e, or greenhouse gas, emissions—more than 58 times Uganda’s total annual emissions, they contend.
Uganda is particularly impacted by climate change, having already suffered from “record-breaking occurrences of floods, devastating and frequent droughts and erratic rainfall patterns”, according to a report sent by the Ugandan government to the UN, which will only increase as climate change worsens.
“The case is one of a growing number of legal claims seeking to hold global energy companies and infrastructure providers to account for the emissions resulting from their extraction of fossil fuels,” Leigh Day said in a statement.
“Our clients believe the EACOP pipeline will result in enormous damage to the global climate as well as severe damage to their local environment. The EACOP will lead to a huge amount of oil being burnt in a world where the UN has confirmed there are already far more fossil fuels slated for extraction than required if we are to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement, said Leigh Day solicitor Joe Snape, who will represent the group.
The fact that the pipeline is operated and financed by a UK-registered company highlights the role UK corporates often have in fossil fuel extraction projects in the Global South, he added
He further noted, “Our clients are already living on the frontline of the climate crisis and argue this pipeline will only exacerbate the impact they, and other vulnerable communities around the world, experience on their lives and livelihoods. They are calling for the pipeline construction and operations to be halted to stop this damaging impact on the climate in Uganda and elsewhere around the world.”
While around a third (460 km) of the pipeline will run through the basin of Lake Victoria, Africa’s largest lake, local environmentalists warn that a spill or leak could potentially result in catastrophic effects for the lake, which is a vital water resource in the region and a significant source for the River Nile.
The pipeline will also run through and disturb important habitats and nature reserves, including Murchison Falls National Park, the Taala Forest Reserve, and the Bugoma Forest. The pipeline will reportedly disturb around 2,000 square kilometres of protected habitats, impacting rare and endangered species that inhabit them, such as Eastern Chimpanzees and African Elephants.
For its part, Avaaz said its fundraising effort will support the “groundbreaking” court helping expose the environmental abuses and climate devastation that this project will cause. Further, it will help to defend land rights for Indigenous and frontline communities and “continue the quest to protect life on Earth.”
“With help from Avaaz members, communities in East Africa have already fought this project through regional courts — but their case was dismissed on a technicality. This new lawsuit in the UK is the last remaining path to stopping this monster pipeline. Legal experts believe it offers a far better shot at a fair, independent hearing — with a real possibility of success,” the campaign noted.
The group promised to “stage an epic media stunt” around the launch of the court case, increasing pressure on insurance companies to walk away from the project, and support families in Uganda and Tanzania who are fighting evictions, providing cash assistance for food, medicine and other basic necessities.
The USD 5.6 billion project was initiated in 2016 amid delays, resistance, and scrutiny. Over the past two years, EACOP has accelerated, with infrastructure taking shape along its route and at its two key oil fields: Tilenga, awarded to TotalEnergies, and Kingfisher, awarded to CNOOC.
IPS UN Bureau Report
MEXICO CITY, Apr 3 2026 (IPS) - In Asunción, Paraguay last month, finance ministers, central bank presidents, and private sector leaders gathered for the Inter-American Development Bank’s (IDB) Annual Meetings to talk about growth.
In a session titled “Seizing Opportunities, Stimulating Growth” hosted by IDB Invest, the bank’s private sector institution, they discussed how investment and innovation could strengthen agribusiness and food systems across Latin America.
One place to start is clear: the IDB Invest should exclude industrial livestock production from its portfolio. Industrial animal agriculture is a leading driver of deforestation, water pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions in the region.
It puts profits in the hands of a few, while rural and Indigenous communities are left to deal with dirty water, damaged land, and fewer ways to earn a living. Yet at the very session dedicated to agribusiness, livestock was conspicuously absent from the conversation.
If the IDB Invest won’t even acknowledge the problem, it’s obviously not trying to solve it. Public development money shouldn’t be funding an industry that worsens the climate crisis and harms communities.
Equally troubling is the lack of transparency when projects do move forward. When the IDB Invest supports a project, communities have a right to understand its risks, impacts, and benefits. That did not happen, for example, in the case of Pronaca, an Ecuadorian agribusiness company that received a $50 million loan from IDB Invest.
An independent investigation by the Bank’s own accountability mechanism found seven violations of environmental and social safeguards, including failures to disclose critical information and assess the company’s role in the contamination of a local river that the Indigenous Tsáchila community rely on for food and hygiene, and which holds deep spiritual significance within their cosmology.
But key environmental documents were classified as confidential, and meaningful information was never shared. This isn’t just a problem with the IBD’s internal procedures. It can have real impacts on human rights.
Perhaps most importantly, the IDB Invest must ensure the effective participation of affected communities from the very beginning of any project. In the Pronaca case, the investigation found no evidence that nearby Indigenous communities were consulted at all, even though one community is located just a few hundred meters from a facility.
This absence of consultation wasn’t accidental, but instead part of a deep imbalance of power, where decisions are made in boardrooms and imposed on territories without consent. Communities must have a seat at the table, not as an afterthought, but as decision-makers with the ability to shape, or reject, projects that affect their futures. Anything less is incompatible with the IDB Invest’s stated mission to reduce inequality.
This month’s meeting in Paraguay showed that the IDB Group is quite ambitious when it comes to growth in Latin America. However, it would be a mistake for the IDB to believe that growth is the only measure of progress and should be the priority no matter the cost.
Right now, the IDB has the opportunity and the responsibility to pursue a sustainable growth agenda by excluding harmful industries, committing to full transparency, and including the impacted communities at every step of the process. To do that, the IDB must listen to those who were not in the room, and must recognize that economic growth cannot be built on weakened ecosystems and silenced communities.
Claudia Escorza, the Latin America Regional Coordinator for “Stop Financing Factory Farming (S3F) coalition, is based in Mexico City, and advocates sustainable food systems.
IPS UN Bureau
JOHANNESBURG, South Africa, Apr 3 2026 (IPS) - By Easter 2026 it was still not clear when – or how – the war initiated by Israel and the US against Iran would end. But what was already clear was that it would harm Africa in a number of ways.
Firstly, it would adversely affect the global supply and prices of oil and gas, fertilisers and food. Secondly, local currencies would be affected. More than a month after the war had started a number of African currencies had begun to lose value against the US dollar.
Thirdly, interest rates stopped falling and further rate increases were highly likely. Fourth, there will be a decline in access to affordable foreign financing.
How should Africa respond?
African countries cannot avoid being harmed by the current Gulf war. Nevertheless, based on my work in international economic law and global economic governance, I think there are two lessons that, if followed, can help the continent emerge from the crisis in a better place.
First, governments and societies need to be pragmatic. Their first priority must be to do whatever they can to mitigate the impact of the war, particularly on their most vulnerable citizens. This will require governments to make trade-offs.
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They will have to reallocate budgets to at least maintain the level of imports necessary to meet the society’s basic needs. They will need to convince their creditors to help finance their necessary imports. They will also need to persuade them to be flexible enough that they leave governments with at least some policy space.
Second, states and societies need to identify opportunities within the crisis for actions that over the medium term can help them meet their financing, economic, environmental and social challenges. This requires collaboration between the state and its non-state stakeholders. Business, labour, religious groups, civil society organisations and international organisations all have something to contribute.
Oil price surge is hurting African economies: scholars in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa take stock
Action in the short run
The focus of Africa’s efforts in the short term must be on minimising the negative effects of the war and on managing the state’s external debts in the most sustainable and effective way.
This is easy to state, but hard to implement. This is particularly the case in the current international environment, in which it is not realistic to expect donor countries and other international sources of finance to be particularly generous.
African countries will need to convince their creditors to acknowledge that this crisis is beyond Africa’s control and that they should not compound the pain that’s being experienced. This will require, at a minimum, that the creditors agree to suspend debt payments for the next year.
Creditors have already accepted the principle that debt payments can be suspended when debt challenges arise from sources beyond the debtor’s control. Many of them have accepted clauses requiring such action under specific conditions in their most recent debt contracts. They also did this during COVID.
Second, African countries, which are already heavily indebted, should challenge their multilateral creditors to accept the consequences of being among the biggest creditors for the continent. This includes the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank. By custom these institutions are treated as preferred creditors.
This means that they get paid before all other creditors. Instead of participating in any debt restructurings, they also make new loans to the debtor in crisis. This shifts the debt restructuring burden onto the debtor’s other creditors. It also increases the total amount owed to the multilaterals.
This cannot continue. These institutions need to be more creative in providing Africa to financing. This should include:
• Using their financial resources to guarantee the financial transactions of African countries so that they can reduce their borrowing costs and attract new equity investments.• More generously supporting innovative debt for development swaps. These involve creditors agreeing with African sovereign debtors to convert a portion of the existing debts into financing for specific local projects, for example in health or education.
• Helping African governments convert their foreign exchange denominated debts into local currency debts at affordable interest rates.
Third, governments should work with the Alliance of African Multilateral Financial Institutions to use these institutions more effectively to finance African development. For example:
• They should require the institutions to only undertake transactions that are consistent with their development mandates. This means no more opaque transactions like the recent one that the African Finance Corporation concluded with Senegal.• African governments should take the necessary action to activate the African Financial Stability Mechanism that they agreed to establish last year. This would create a useful financial safety net for the continent.
Fourth, African governments must build on the efforts they began last year to become a more effective advocate for African development financing interests at the international level. Among these efforts was the initiative by African ministers of finance to develop common African positions on sovereign debt restructurings. Another was South Africa’s launch of the African Expert Panel that proposed a number of initiatives on African debt and development financing.
In the medium term
African countries should advocate for the IMF to review its governance arrangements so that it becomes more accountable and responsive to developing countries, including African states and societies.
They should also advocate for the IMF to more use its existing resources, including its gold reserves, more creatively to support Africa.
Second, Africa should call for a debate on the preferred creditor status of multilateral financial institutions. This has become particularly relevant because the members of the Alliance of African Multilateral Financial Institutions are claiming that, like all other multilateral financial institutions, they are entitled to this status.
It is not clear that there are good arguments for excluding these institutions from preferred creditor status while protecting the position of the legacy institutions. This suggests that there is a need for some general principles that help determine which institutions should be treated as preferred creditors. These should be acceptable to all multilateral financial institutions and other market participants.
Third, African societies must make every effort to demonstrate that they are taking control of their own development. They should demand that their governments and all other actors in African development finance behave responsibly in regard to the financial, economic, environmental and social aspects of these transactions.
Another medium-term objective should be to limit the illicit financial flows that are so often associated with international trade and investment. This goal would be advanced by the successful conclusion of the current efforts to agree on a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation.
Prof Daniel D. Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship at the University of Pretoria, was Senior Non-Resident Fellow, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University and Professor Emeritus, American University Washington College of Law
Source: Conversation Africa
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